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This short paper isolates a non-trivial class of games for which
there exists a monotone relation between the size of pure strategy
spaces and the number of pure Nash equilibria (Theorem). This class
is that of two-player nice games, i.e., games with compact real in-
tervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave
payoﬀ functions, assumptions met by many economic models. We
then show that the suﬃcient conditions for Theorem to hold are tight.
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11 Introduction
An old and central problem in Game Theory is the enumeration of all Nash
equilibria of a game.1 This problem turns out to be a diﬃcult and tedious
one, and to date, there is even no complete answer for “small” games like
m × m bi-matrix games.2 However, a close look at this literature shows
that there is, in general, a monotone relation between the number of pure
strategies and the maximal number of (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria.
Similarly, several papers tackle the issue of the mean number of equilibria
(e.g., Berg and McLennan [1], McLennan [6]) and, again, show that there is a
monotone relation between the number of strategies and the (mean) number
of equilibria.3
In this paper, we are interested in a slightly diﬀerent question: Can we
isolate a class of games for which there exists a monotone relation between the
size of pure strategy spaces and the exact number of pure Nash equilibria?
An immediate answer to this question is the class of games with constant
payoﬀs i.e., games such that for each strategy proﬁle, the payoﬀ to all players
is the same, since for such games all strategy proﬁles are equilibria. However,
this class is trivial and non-generic. The non-trivial answer we propose in
this paper is the class of two-player nice games, i.e., games with non-empty
compact real intervals as strategy spaces, and continuous and strictly quasi-
concave payoﬀ functions, assumptions met by many economic models. More
precisely, we consider two two-player nice games G and G0 such that both
players have smaller strategy sets in G0 compared to G, and show that each
equilibrium strategy proﬁle of G0 can be paired with an equilibrium strategy
proﬁle of G. The core of our proof precisely consists then in showing that
1See McKelvey and McLennan [5] or von Stengel [10] for recent surveys.
2For instance, after proving that when m = 3 there is at most 7 equilibria (provided the
game satisﬁes some regularity conditions), Quint and Shubik [8] conjectured that 2m − 1
would be an upper bound. This bound turns out to be correct when m = 4 but not when
m ≥ 6 (see McLennan and Park [7] and von Stengel [9]). The conjecture remains open for
m = 5.
3For instance, using techniques from statistical mechanics, Berg and McLennan show
that the mean number of Nash equilibria in bi-matrix games with m pure strategies for
each player is exp(m[0.281644 + O(log(m)/m)]).
2this pairing map is injective. It is also of interest to note that equilibrium
sets are not necessarily nested.
Finally, we extensively discuss the conditions for our theorem to hold
and show that they are tight. For instance, little reﬂexion suﬃces to realize
that for strategic-form games with ﬁnite strategy spaces, our result does not
hold. To see this, consider the game G0 in Figure 1, that has two pure Nash
equilibria. Adding to each player a strictly dominating strategy we obtain
this way a game like the game G in Figure 1. Because G is dominance






0 1,1 2,4 −1,−1
1 4,0 4,4 4,1
2 0,0 1,4 3,3
G
Figure 1: Games with ﬁnite strategy spaces
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and states
our main result. Section 3 proves our main result while section 4 discusses
the tightness of our suﬃcient conditions. Section 5 gives some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Deﬁnitions and Theorem
Let G(Y ) :=< N,(Yi,ui)i∈N > be a strategic-form game with Y :=
Q
i∈N Yi.
N = {1,...,n} is the set of players, Yi is the set of pure strategies available to
player i. Denote Y−i =
Q
j6=i(Yj) and y−i an element of Y−i. Player i’s payoﬀ
function is ui : Yi × Y−i → R. A strategic-form game G(Y ) is a nice game
if for each player i ∈ N, Yi is a non-empty real intervals (i.e., a compact,
convex subset of the real line), and the payoﬀ function ui is continuous in all
its arguments, and strictly quasi-concave in yi, that is, for all y−i ∈ Y−i, for
4Observe that the “trick” of using mixed strategies to bypass the ﬁniteness of pure
strategies does not work either.
3all yi ∈ Yi, y0
i ∈ Yi and α ∈ (0,1),





We denote N(G(Y )) the set of pure Nash equilibria of G(Y ).
For two strategic-form games G(X) :=< N,(Xi,vi)i∈N > and G(Y ) :=<
N,(Yi,ui)i∈N >, we say that G(X) is a restriction of G(Y ) if for each player
i ∈ N, Xi ⊆ Yi and vi(x) = ui(x) for all x ∈ X. In words, a game G(X) is a
restriction of a game G(Y ) if G(X) is obtained from G(Y ) by restricting the
set of pure strategies of some players.
The restriction of strategy sets can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways. For
instance, we could assume that players have committed not to play some of
their strategies, as it is the case in competition models in which ﬁrms must
choose capacity constrains, or that players have signed contracts that limit
their course of actions as in Bernheim and Winston [2]. It is also interesting
to note that there exists a formal relationship between “more strategies” and
“more information” in games. For instance, Gossner [4] shows that for any
restriction G0 of a strategic-form game G, there exists two equivalent games
of incomplete information, with strategic-form games G0 and G, such that
players are more informed in G than in G0. Thus, “more strategies” is merely
a synonym for more information.
We can also note that if G(X) is a restriction of G(Y ) and G(X0) is a
restriction of G(X), then G(X0) is a restriction of G(Y ). However, if both
G(X) and G(X0) are restrictions of G(Y ), we do not necessarily have that
G(X) is a restriction of G(X0) or G(X0) is a restriction of G(X). G(Y ) is
obviously a restriction of itself.
Theorem Let G(X) and G(Y ) be two two-player nice games such that G(X)
is a restriction of G(Y ). We have
]N(G(X)) ≤ ]N(G(Y )).
Theorem states that for any two two-player nice games G and G0 such
both players have smaller strategy sets in G0 compared to G, G has more
Nash equilibria in pure strategies than G0. In particular, this implies that if
G has a unique Nash equilibrium, then G0 has also a unique equilibrium.
43 Proof of Theorem
Let G(X) and G(Y ) be two two-player nice games with G(X) a restriction
of G(Y ). To prove Theorem, we show that there exists an injective mapping
from the set of equilibria N(G(X)) of the restricted game G(X) to the set
of equilibria N(G(Y )). First, observe that N(G(Y )) as well as N(G(X)) are
non-empty sets and generically ﬁnite (Harsanyi [3]). Second, note that we can
obviously map each equilibrium of G(X), that is also an equilibrium of G(Y ),
to itself. Therefore, the crucial part of the proof consists in showing that
there exists an injective mapping that associates an equilibrium in N(G(Y ))\
N(G(X)) to each equilibrium of the restricted game in N(G(X))\N(G(Y )).
Lastly, observe that if N(G(X)) \ N(G(Y )) = ∅, there is nothing to prove.
From now on, suppose that N(G(X)) \ N(G(Y )) 6= ∅.
3.1 Characterization of N(G(X)) \ N(G(Y ))
Deﬁne brX
i : X−i → Xi the best-reply map of player i in the game G(X)
with for all x−i ∈ X−i,
br
X





It is worth noting that brX
i is a continuous, non-empty, single-valued map in
any nice game G(X). For simplicity, we denote BRi the best-reply of player
i in the game G(Y ), that is BRi := brY
i . For any non-empty compact real
interval Z, we denote z its least upper bound and z its greatest lower bound.
Our ﬁrst lemma characterizes brX
i as a function of BRi and Xi.
Lemma 1 Player i’s best-reply function brX








xi if BRi(x−i) < xi
BRi(x−i) if xi ≤ BRi(x−i) ≤ xi
xi if xi > BRi(x−i)
.
Proof First, it is clear that for any x−i in the set {x−i ∈ X−i : BRi(x−i) ∈
Xi}, brX
i (x−i) = BRi(x−i). Second, choose a x−i ∈ X−i such that BRi(x−i) <
5xi, and suppose that brX
i (x−i) > xi. The single-valuedness of the best-
reply maps implies that u(BRi(x−i),x−i) > u(xi,x−i) and u(brX
i (x−i),x−i) >
u(xi,x−i). It follows that (BRi(x−i),x−i) and (brX
i (x−i),x−i) both belong to
the strict upper contour set of (xi,x−i). Since BRi(x−i) < xi < brX
i (x−i), we
have a contradiction with the strict quasi-concavity of ui. An analogous rea-
soning holds if we choose a x−i ∈ X−i such that BRi(x−i) > xi, and suppose
brX
i (x−i) < xi. 
In words, the best-reply map brX
i of the restricted game G(X) agrees with
the best-reply map BRi of the game G(Y ) on the set {x−i ∈ X−i : BRi(x−i) ∈
Xi}, and is on the boundary ∂Xi of Xi, otherwise. The next lemma states
a quite obvious property of a restricted game, that is, if G(Y ) has a Nash
equilibrium y∗, which is also a feasible action proﬁle of the restricted game
G(X), then y∗ is also a Nash equilibrium of G(X).
Lemma 2 If there exists a Nash equilibrium y∗ = (y∗
i)i∈N of G(Y ) such that
y∗ ∈ X, then y∗ ∈ N(G(X)).
Proof Since y∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G(Y ) and y∗
i ∈ Xi ⊆ Yi for all
i ∈ N, we have that ui(y∗
i,y∗
−i) ≥ ui(xi,y∗
−i), for all xi ∈ Xi ⊆ Yi and all
i ∈ N, hence y∗ ∈ N(G(X)). 
In the previous lemma, we have seen that any equilibrium of G(Y ), which
belongs to the restricted set of strategies X, is also an equilibrium of G(X).
The converse is obviously not true. However, we can prove that any interior
equilibrium of G(X) is also an equilibrium of G(Y ).
Lemma 3 If there exists a Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗
i)i∈N of G(X) such that
x∗ ∈ intX, then x∗ ∈ N(G(Y )).
Proof Since x∗ ∈ intX, we have that xi < x∗
i < xi for all i ∈ N. Further-
more, since x∗ ∈ N(G(X)), we have that x∗
i = brX
i (x∗
−i) for all i ∈ N. From
Lemma 1, it follows that brX
i (x∗
−i) = BRi(x∗
−i) for all i ∈ N, hence x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium of G(Y ). 
It immediately follows that the equilibria of G(X), which are not equilib-
ria of G(Y ), are on the boundary of X. The next proposition formally states
this result.
6Proposition 1 If x∗ ∈ N(G(X)) \ N(G(Y )), then x∗ ∈ ∂X.
Proof It is a direct consequence of Lemmata 2 and 3. 
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let G(X) and G(Y ) be two two-player nice games such that G(X)
is a restriction of G(Y ). Then,
](N(G(X)) \ N(G(Y ))) ≤ 4.
Proof From Proposition 1, any x ∈ N(G(X)) \ N(G) is such that x ∈
∂X. Moreover, since X is the product of two compact real intervals, ∂X is
composed of 4 edges. By strict quasi-concavity of the payoﬀ functions, we
have at most one Nash equilibrium on each edge of X, hence the desired
result. 
Next, consider the sequence of strategy sets X0 = Y1×Y2, X1 = X1×Y2
and X2 = X1 × X2, and the sequence of games G(X0), G(X1),G(X2).
Observe that G(X2) is a restriction of G(X1) with the property that G(X2)
diﬀers from G(X1) only in the set of strategies of player 2. Similarly, G(X1) is
a restriction of G(X0) with the property that G(X1) diﬀers from G(X0) only
in the set of strategies of player 1. By transitivity, G(X2) is a restriction
of G(X0). As a direct corollary of Proposition 1, we have that for any
x∗ ∈ N(G(X1)) \ N(G(X0)), x∗
1 ∈ ∂X1.
Thus, if G(X1) is a restriction of G(X0), which diﬀers only in the set of
strategies of a single player, say player 1, then any equilibrium of G(X1),
which is not an equilibrium of G(X0) is such that player 1’s equilibrium
strategy is on the boundary of his strategy space. This result will prove
extremely useful in proving Theorem as our strategy of proof will consist in
showing that ]N(G(X1)) ≤ ]N(G(X0)), and thus, by an induction argument,
that ]N(G(X)) ≤ ]N(G(Y )).
3.2 Injective mapping
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote bri the best-reply function of player
i in G(X1), i.e., bri := brX1
i . Let us show that ]N(G(X1)) ≤ ]N(G(X0)).
7Choose a x∗ = (x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ N(G(X1)) \ N(G(X0)). From a previous ar-
gument, we have that x∗
1 ∈ ∂X1. Suppose that x∗
1 = x1. (We can reason
in analogy if x∗
1 = x1 holds.) Since x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G(X1), x∗
1
satisﬁes the equation f(x∗
1) = 0 with f : X1 → R, f(x1) = br1(br2(x1)) − x1.
Remember that BRi is the best-reply function of player i in the game
G(X0), and deﬁne F : Y1 → R with F(y1) = BR1(BR2(y1)) − y1. Observe
that F(y
1) ≥ 0 and F(y1) ≤ 0. Moreover, since x∗ / ∈ N(G(X0)), we have
F(x∗
1) 6= 0.
From Lemma 1, br2 is the restriction of BR2 to the domain X1 ⊆ Y1, hence
br2(x∗
1) = BR2(x∗
1). It follows that F(x∗




1)), a contradiction with Lemma 1.
Since F is continuous, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem
that there exists a y∗
1 in (x∗
1,y1] such that F(y∗
1) = 0. Hence, we can asso-
ciate to x∗ ∈ N(G(X1)) \ N(G(X0)) an equilibrium y∗ = (y∗
1,BR2(y∗
1)) in
N(G(X0))\N(G(X1)). Note that if x∗ is such that x∗
1 = x1, we associate to
x∗ an equilibrium y∗ such that y∗
1 ∈ [y
1,x1).
For completeness, suppose that ∂X1 ∩ ∂Y1, and that x∗ ∈ N(G(X1)) \
N(G(X0)) is such that x∗









a contradiction. A similar reasoning holds if x∗
1 = y
1. Hence, for any Nash
equilibrium x∗ ∈ N(G(X1))\N(G(X0)), we can associate a Nash equilibrium
y∗ in N(G(X0)) \ N(G(X1)). The last part of the proof consists in showing
that for any two Nash equilibria x∗ 6= x∗∗ of G(X1), we can associate two
diﬀerent Nash equilibria y∗ 6= y∗∗ of G(X0).
Clearly, if x∗
1 6= x∗∗




1 implies that x∗
1 is x1 and
x∗∗
1 is xi or the inverse, hence y∗
1 is a zero of F in (x1,y1] and y∗∗
1 is a zero
of F in [y
1,x1). Suppose that x∗
1 = x∗∗
1 . But, then since best-reply map are
single-valued, we have that br2(x∗
1) = br2(x∗∗
1 ), a contradiction with x∗ 6= x∗∗.
Therefore, we have that ]N(G(X1)) ≤ ]N(G(X0)).
8To complete the proof, apply the preceding arguments to prove that
]N(G(X2)) ≤ ]N(G(X1)), hence that ]N(G(X)) ≤ ]N(G(Y )).
4 Tightness of Theorem
To recapitulate, the suﬃcient conditions for our theorem to hold are that
both G(X) and G(Y ) are two-player nice games i.e., games with non-empty
real intervals as strategy spaces and continuous and strictly quasi-concave
payoﬀ functions. We ﬁrst show that Theorem does neither extend to n-
player games, nor to games with multidimensional compact-convex strategy
spaces, nor to games with payoﬀ functions that are not strictly quasi-concave.
Interestingly enough, in all three cases, our proof breaks down at the same
point: the mapping from N(G(X)) to N(G(Y )) needs not be an injection.
Example 1 (Two-player games) Consider the following three-player nice
game5 G(Y ). Assume that the strategy spaces are Y1 = Y2 = Y3 = [0,1].
Player 1’s payoﬀ when he plays y1, player 2 plays y2 and player 3 plays y3 is
u1(y1,y2,y3) = y1.
Similarly, player 2’s payoﬀ is
u2(y1,y2,y3) = −0.1(y2)
2 + (1 − y1)y3y2,
and player 3’s payoﬀ is
u3(y1,y2,y3) = −(y3 − y2)
2.
Since player 1’s payoﬀ is strictly increasing in its own strategy, it follows
that 1 is a strictly dominant strategy. The Nash equilibria of G(Y ) are
then the points at which the graph of the restriction of BR2 to {1} × Y3
intersects the graph of the restriction of BR3 to {1} × Y2. It follows that
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of G(Y ), namely (1,0,0). Assume now
that player 1 has a restricted set of strategy X1 = [0,0.5]. Player 1’s new
strictly dominant action is 0.5. G(X) has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria:
(0.5,0,0) and (0.5,1,1).
5We thank Andrew McLennan for having suggested us this example.
9Example 2 (Actions are subset of the real line) Consider the follow-
ing two-player game G(Y ) that is nice except for the assumption that player
1’s strategy space is multidimensional. Player 1’s action is the unit square
Y1 = [0,1]×[0,1], and his payoﬀ when he plays y1 = (y1
1,y2
1) ∈ Y1 and player
2 plays y2 ∈ Y2 := [0,1], is
u1(y1,y2) = y
1




while player 2’s payoﬀ is
u2(y1,y2) = −0.1(y2)





Clearly, this example is a very close relative of the previous example, and
has similar equilibria. The strategy proﬁle ((1,0),0) is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game G(Y ). However, the game G([0,0.5]×[0,1],[0,1]) has
more than one equilibrium: ((0.5,0),0) and ((0.5,1),1) are both equilibrium
proﬁles.
Example 3 (Strict quasi-concavity) Consider a two-player game G(Y )
that is nice except for the assumption that player 2’s payoﬀ function is strictly
quasi-concave. We have Y1 = Y2 = [0,1] and the payoﬀ to player 1 when
he plays y1 and player 2 plays y2 is u1(y1,y2) = y1 while player 2’s payoﬀ is
u2(y1,y2) = (0.5−y1)y2. G(Y ) has a unique Nash equilibrium (1,0). Now, let
us restrict player 1’s strategy space to [0,0.5]. The game G([0,0.5]×[0,1]) has
inﬁnitely many equilibria: any (0.5,λ) with λ ∈ [0,1] is a Nash equilibrium.
If we drop any one of the other suﬃcient conditions i.e., convexity or com-
pactness of strategy spaces or continuity of payoﬀ functions, our proof might
fail for an additional reason. Any two-player game with either discontinuous
payoﬀs or non-compact strategy spaces that does not have an equilibrium
can serve as an example to illustrate this point. To see this, take any such
game G(Y ) and restrict both players’ strategy spaces to singletons {x1} and
{x2}. The strategy proﬁle (x1,x2) is an equilibrium of G({x1}×{x2}), which
clearly cannot be mapped to an equilibrium in N(G(Y )) since this set is
empty. However, even if G(Y ) has a Nash equilibrium, our proof still fails as
the following examples show.
10Example 4 (Convexity) Consider the example in the introduction. G
is a nice game except for the assumption that strategies space are con-
vex. To see that strict quasi-concavity is satisﬁed, observe that ui(1,y−i) >
min(ui(0,y−i),ui(2,y−i)) for all y−i ∈ {0,1,2}, for all i ∈ {1,2}. Continuity
refers to order-continuity (we endow {0,1,2} with the usual order ≥).
Example 5 (Compactness) Consider a two-player symmetric game G(Y )
that is nice except for the assumption that strategy spaces are compact. For
all i ∈ {1,2}, Yi = R, ui(yi,y−i) = (1 − 2y−i)yi − 1
2y2
i. G(Y ) has unique
Nash equilibrium (1
3, 1
3). Now, consider the restriction G(X) of G(Y ), with
X = [0, 1





Example 6 (Continuity) Consider a two-player game G(Y ) that is nice
except for the assumption that payoﬀ function u2 of player 2 is continuous.
Player 1’s payoﬀ u1(y1,y2) when he plays x1 ∈ [3
5, 4















Player 2’s payoﬀ u2(y1,y2) when she plays y2 and player 1 plays y1 is
(
(y1 − 1)y2 if y2 > 1
2
y1(y2 − 1) if y2 ≤ 1
2
.
G(Y ) has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. (In fact, it is because u2
fails to be upper semi-continuous). Now, consider the restricted game G(X)








Theorem states that any two-player nice game G(X), which is a restriction of
the two-player nice game G(Y ), has fewer Nash equilibria in pure strategies
than the game G(Y ) . The theorem is silent on whether a restriction G(X)
11admits strictly less Nash equilibria than the game G(Y ). However, it is easy
to construct examples for which some restrictions have strictly less Nash
equilibria than the game G(Y ) while some others have exactly the same
number of Nash equilibria. For instance, consider the two-player symmetric
game G(Y ), and for all i ∈ N, Yi = [0,1], (yi,y−i) 7→ ui(yi,y−i) = (1 −
2y−i)xi − 1
2(yi)2. It is straightforward to check that G(Y ) is indeed a nice
game. G(Y ) has three Nash equilibria in pure strategies (1,0),(0,1) and
(1
3, 1
3). To see this, observe that i’s best-reply to y−i is 1−2y−i if y−i ∈ [0, 1
2]
and 0, otherwise. Consider the restriction G(X) of G(Y ), with X = [0, 1
2] ×
[0, 1
2]. G(X) has a unique Nash equilibrium (1
3, 1
3). Similarly, consider the




5]. It is easy to see that







We can also mention a discrete counterpart6 of Theorem. Suppose that
strategy spaces are discrete Yi := {1,2,··· ,mi} for all i ∈ {1,2}, and payoﬀ
functions are order-continuous, strictly quasi-concave and have increasing
diﬀerences in (yi,y−i). Consider two such games G(X) and G(Y ) such that
G(X) is a restriction of G(Y ). We then have that ]N(G(X)) ≤ ]N(G(Y )).
The proof is almost identical to our proof. First, observe that since G(Y )
as well as G(X) are supermodular games, hence N(G(Y ) and N(G(X)) are
non-empty. Second, the characterization of N(G(X))\N(G(Y )) is the same
as in our proof. Finally, it suﬃces to apply Tarsky ﬁxed-point Theorem
(instead of the Intermediate Value Theorem) to show that the map from
N(G(X)) to N(G(Y )) is injective.
Finally, we remark that Theorem holds for regular as well as irregular
nice games G(Y ). Moreover, it might well be that G(Y ) is a regular game,
hence has a ﬁnite and odd number of Nash equilibria (Harsanyi ([3]), but
G(X) has an even number of Nash equilibria, hence is not regular.
References
[1] J. Berg, and A. McLennan, “Asymptotic Expected Number of Nash
Equilibria of a Normal Form Game”, Games and Economic Behavior,
6We thank Joseph Abdou for having suggested us this discrete counterpart.
12(2004), doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.008
[2] B.D., Bernheim and M.D., Whinston, “Incomplete Contracts and
Strategic Ambiguity”, American Economic Review, 88(4), (1998), pp.
902-932.
[3] J.C., Harsanyi, “Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: a New
Proof”, International Journal of Game Theory, 2, (1973), pp. 235-250.
[4] O., Gossner, “Ability and Knowledge”, 2004, Mimeo
http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/labo/AbilKnow.pdf.
[5] R.D. McKelvey and A. McLennan, Computation of Equilibria in Finite
Games, in Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. I, pp. 87–142.
Ed. H.M. Aumann, D.A., Kendrick, and J. Rust, Elsevier, 1996.
[6] A., McLennan, “The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Nornal
Form Game”, Econometrica, 73, 2005, pp. 141-174.
[7] A. McLennan and I.-U. Park, “Generic 4 × 4 games have at most 15
Nash equilibria”, Games Economic Behavior, 26 (1999) (1), pp. 111130.
[8] T. Quint and M. Shubik, “On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bi-
matrix Game,” International Journal of Game Theory, 26 (1997), pp.
353–359.
[9] B. von Stengel, New maximal numbers of equilibria in bimatrix games,
Discrete & Computational Geometry, 21 (1999), pp. 557568.
[10] B. von Stengel, Computing equilibria for two-person games In: R. Au-
mann and S. Hart, Editors, Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 3, North-
Holland, Amsterdam (2002), pp. 1723–1759.
13